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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Current fiscal policy is unsustainable and large, prospective deficits and debt, driven by “mandatory” 
spending on social benefits for the aging population and insufficient revenues, pose an eventual threat 
to the U.S. economy.  Yet partisan divided government has failed to address this long-run problem 
sensibly, instead encouraging policy that is short-sighted, arbitrary, and driven by calendar-based crises.  
These policies have:   
· Saddled a still-struggling economy with the “fiscal drag” of a contraction in discretionary 
spending.  
 
· Created general uncertainty about fiscal policy that, through its impact on financial markets, has 
undermined economic growth.  
 
· Forced the first prolonged shutdown of the federal government since the first term of the 
Clinton Administration.  
 
· Failed to raise the federal debt ceiling in a timely manner, conjuring the specter of a sovereign 
default, with all its financial and economic fallout. 
Results developed here suggest that the recent fiscal drag, in combination with heightened fiscal 
uncertainty, has slowed the annualized rate of growth in the nation’s Gross Domestic Product by as 
much as 1 percentage point since 2010.  And while the government shutdown is, for now, more 
economic inconvenience than catastrophe, the consequences stemming from the failure to increase the 
debt ceiling could cause the next recession, even if the U.S. does not default on its debt. 
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Current Fiscal Policy is Unsustainable  
In its recent report on the long-term budget the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that under 
current law, the federal deficit, after dropping to 2.1% percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 
fiscal year (FY) 2015, will climb steadily to 6.4% percent by FY 2038.  In this scenario, the federal debt 
will reach 100% of GDP within 25 years—a level not seen since World War II—and will continue to rise 
thereafter.1  Under less optimistic assumptions CBO projects that debt could climb to 190% of GDP over 
the same period.  Driving both projections is a mismatch between revenues and outlays.  In coming 
decades, outlays climb because of rapid increases in “mandatory spending” for Social Security and 
healthcare, which reflect an aging population and the rising relative price of healthcare.  In contrast, 
CBO projects that under current law “discretionary spending”—outlays budgeted through the 
appropriations process primarily to fund operations of the civilian government and the US military—will 
fall from 8% of GDP in FY 2012 to 5.3% by FY 2023, the lowest level in half a century.  Hence, the nation’s 
fundamental fiscal problem is not the immediate size of government, but rather unfunded promises of 
future entitlements.  
The Deleterious Effect of Deficits  
Economists agree that failure to shrink prospective deficits and debt will bestow significant economic 
consequences and risks on future generations.  Federal deficits drive up interest rates, “crowding out” 
private investment.  If government borrowing supports consumption (e.g., through Social Security and 
major health programs) rather than public investment, the nation’s overall capital stock declines, 
undermining our standard of living.  The process is slow but the eventual impact is large.2  In addition, 
accumulating debt raises the risk of a fiscal crisis. No one can say when this might occur but, unlike 
crowding out, a debt crisis could develop unexpectedly once debt reached high levels.    
High deficits and debt also undermine the efficacy of macroeconomic policies and reduce policymakers’ 
flexibility to respond to unexpected events.  For example, in a recession, it would be harder to provide 
fiscal stimulus if deficits and debt already were high.  Furthermore, fiscal stimulus might be less effective 
then.  Additional deficit spending could be seen as pushing the nation closer to crisis, thereby forcing up 
interest rates and undercutting the effects of the stimulus.  With fiscal policy hamstrung, the burden of 
counter-cyclical policy is thrust on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) but, particularly in a low 
interest-rate environment, the FOMC may be unable (or unwilling) to provide additional monetary 
stimulus.3 
                                                             
1 The Congressional Budget Office, The 2013 Long-Term Budget Outlook (September 2013). 
2 Eventually, when yields on Treasury debt rise persistently above the economy’s underlying growth, the process 
can become explosive.    
3 The FOMC has a “dual mandate” of sustaining “maximum” employment while maintaining “price stability”.  At 
times, the near-term inconsistency of these sometimes-competing objectives can be addressed through 
coordination with fiscal policy—provided fiscal policy is not rendered inoperative by high deficits and debt.  In 
addition, the FOMC cannot reduce the short-term interest rate below the “zero bound”.  Hence, in a low-rate 
environment, the Fed must turn to unconventional policies to provide monetary stimulus.   One such policy is 
“forward guidance,” essentially a promise to keep short-term interest rates lower for longer.  The other is 
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Principles of Sensible Policy 
In addressing our fiscal imbalance policymakers should be guided by a few sensible principles that 
transcend the details of any particular solution. First, policy should address the real problem—the 
mismatch between revenues and the promises made through our entitlement programs—in a credible 
manner. To be credible, a proposed solution must seem realistic, entail shared sacrifice, and include an 
enforcement mechanism not easily overturned by future political regimes. Second, fiscal adjustment 
should begin early enough to avoid a crises-driven response later on.  It will be less painful to discipline 
ourselves politically today than be disciplined by global financial markets tomorrow. Third, while deficit-
reduction eventually raises living standards, initially it can reduce economic growth and raise 
unemployment.  Only later does the resulting decline in interest rates, perhaps accelerated by easier 
monetary policy, stimulate interest-sensitive spending enough to restore the economy to full 
employment at a higher standard of living.4  Fourth, given the trade-off between short and long-run 
effects, fiscal adjustment should be gradual and predictable in order to reduce near-term “fiscal drag” 
while minimizing the adverse impact of policy uncertainty on near-term economic growth.  Fifth, in 
principle, the FOMC can mitigate or even offset entirely the effect of any fiscal drag.  However, 
monetary policy affects the economy with a lag.  Hence, to offset near-term fiscal drag, not only must 
the FOMC be able to cut interest rates, it must do so in advance of the fiscal contraction.  Sixth, the fiscal 
adjustment should be “back-loaded” to occur when the economy is closer to full employment and 
interest rates closer to normal.  At that point, the economy can more easily absorb fiscal drag and the 
FOMC can more effectively respond by lowering interest rates in advance of the fiscal adjustment. 
Recent Insensible Policy 
Unfortunately, polarized government has fostered a systemic refusal—or inability—to legislate sensible 
long-run policies to address U.S. fiscal imbalances.  While there is disagreement over the terms of the 
inter-temporal trade-off implied by the requisite fiscal contraction, the political battle centers on the 
distributive role of government in society.  Intransigence over that issue, combined with the annual 
need to appropriate funding for defense and other discretionary federal programs while avoiding 
sovereign default, has driven Congress and the Administration to adopt short-sighted, sometimes 
seemingly arbitrary policies.  The number of temporary tax provision set to expire at the end of each 
year has risen dramatically over the past two decades.  Too frequently Congress has failed to pass 
annual budget resolutions on time that set overall levels of spending within which priorities are then 
negotiated; and too often lawmakers rely on a series of “continuing resolutions” (CRs) to fund parts of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
“quantitative easing”, the purchase of long-dated Treasury and mortgage-backed securities in an effort to reduce 
long-term interest rates directly.  While these unconventional policies can be effective, they also carry risks that 
may discourage their further use, even in the face of a large fiscal contraction.  For example, the recent back-up in 
long-term yields shows how difficult it might be to “exit” smoothly from the current state of monetary 
accommodation.  In addition, despite today’s low inflation rate, some economists remain concerned about the 
potential inflationary consequences of quantitative easing.     
4 To be sure, this view is not universally held.  Some economists build models that show an immediate 
improvement in GDP following a sharp fiscal contraction usually because the models assume—unrealistically, in 
our judgment—that households and business quickly expect lower future taxes and so feel free to spend enough 
extra to offset any fiscal drag.  Furthermore, often these models assume no unemployment, or treat it as a choice.   
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government over short horizons.  The approaching expiration of each resolution creates uncertainty 
about spending exacerbated by the recurring threat of a shutdown of government’s “non-essential” 
functions.  The political rancor has encouraged use of the debt ceiling as a bargaining chip in fiscal 
negotiations.  That politicians might purposely risk the full faith and credit of the U.S. government, once 
unthinkable, today seems possible. 
This insensible process has produced four adverse policy outcomes without addressing the true long-run 
issue.  First, discretionary spending as a share of GDP has contracted during a weak recovery when the 
Federal Reserve’s ability to offset fiscal drag through easier monetary policy has been limited.5  Second, 
uncertainty surrounding fiscal policy has increased while also becoming skewed towards the “downside” 
with the new risks posed by the specter of government shutdowns and sovereign default.  Indeed, and 
third, political intransigence has now pushed us into the first such sustained shutdown since the Clinton 
Administration.  And fourth, for the second time in two years Treasury debt is approaching its legal limit 
while elected officials trade political barbs.  All this violates sensible principles of policymaking.  But 
what can be said about the costs of these insensible near-term policies? 
Near-Term Drag of the Recent Spending Squeeze 
To assess the economic costs of the recent squeeze on discretionary spending we used our model of the 
U.S. economy to run a “counterfactual” simulation starting in 2011 but maintaining discretionary outlays 
at their 2010 share of GDP.  The results are summarized in Charts 1 and 2.  They suggest that the 
contraction of spending has trimmed annualized GDP growth by 0.7 percentage point since 2010 while 
raising the unemployment rate by 0.8 percentage point—the equivalent of 1.2 million lost jobs.  This 
occurred when the economy was struggling to recover from the “Great Recession”.  Many argued for a 
policy that would have delayed fiscal drag in favor of a back-loaded plan to reduce prospective deficits 
and debt more gradually. 
Fiscal Policy Uncertainty and Recent Economic Performance 
To assess the effects of recent fiscal policy uncertainty on the economy, we created a measure of that 
uncertainty by modifying the “Economic Policy Uncertainty Index” developed by Baker, Bloom and 
Davis.6  Their “main” uncertainty index has four components: (a) news mentions of economic policy 
uncertainty; (b) the value of tax provisions expiring within two years; (c) forecasters’ disagreement 
about government spending one year ahead; (d) forecasters’ disagreement about inflation one year 
ahead.  This last component reflects uncertainty about monetary policy so we expunged it to form an 
aggregate index better reflecting fiscal policy uncertainty alone.  We also removed a cyclical component 
from the index because recessions foster debates about possible fiscal responses, the uncertainty over 
which is the result of a weak economy, not the cause of it.  
                                                             
5 CBO project that discretionary spending will fall from 7.3% of GDP in2014, down more than 2 percentage points 
from 9.4% in 2010.  
6 Scott R. Baker, Nicholas Bloom, and Steven J. Davis, “Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty” (May 19, 2013), 
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Chart 3 shows the resulting index.  From 1986 through 2009 it averaged 98 but following the Great 
Recession it moved persistently higher to an average of 166.  Much of that bulge reflected the looming 
expiration of the “Bush tax cuts”, but it was punctuated by two large spikes.  The first occurred in the 
summer of 2011 during the confrontation between the Obama Administration and House Republicans 
as a CR wound down and Treasury debt approached its limit.  The second was in late 2012 as the U.S. 
approached the “fiscal cliff” with its “triple threat” of a huge tax increase, the “sequestration” dictated 
by the Budget Control Act of 2011, and other spending cuts.    
Although uncertainty might directly discourage households from spending and businesses from hiring 
and investing, we’ve found little evidence of such a direct link.  Fiscal policy uncertainty is, however, 
inversely correlated with stock prices and positively correlated with private “credit spreads”.  Hence, by 
undermining wealth and raising private borrowing costs, fiscal policy uncertainty can indirectly 
undermine household spending as well as business hiring and investment. 
To ascertain how much fiscal policy uncertainty degraded recent economic performance through this 
indirect channel we again used our model of the U.S. economy to run a “counterfactual” simulation 
starting in 2010 but assuming fiscal policy uncertainty remained at its pre-2010 average.  The results are 
summarized in Charts 4 through 6.   According to our estimates, uncertainty raised the Baa corporate 
bond spread over this period by 38 basis points7, lowered GDP growth by 0.3 percentage point per year 
and raised the unemployment rate in 2013 by 0.6 percentage point—the equivalent of 900,000 lost jobs.  
Because GDP growth averaged just 2.1% since 2009, fiscal policy uncertainty alone reduced growth by 
about 12%. 
The Cost of Shutdown 
Non-essential functions of government were closed beginning Tuesday October 1 when the Senate 
rejected efforts by House Republicans to tie funding of the federal government to the defunding of 
“Obamacare”.   History has shown that a shutdown, if relatively brief, is an economic inconvenience not 
a catastrophe.  The last significant shutdown occurred in 1995-96, when Congress, led by Speaker of the 
House Newt Gingrich, played a game of budgetary chicken with President Clinton that ultimately closed 
the federal government for the better part of a month.  During that episode there were actually two 
separate shutdowns. The first lasted five days, from November 14 to November 19.  It affected roughly 
258,000 civilian defense employees and 489,000 nondefense workers.  The number of civilian workers 
affected (747,000) was 36% of the roughly 2.1 million federal civilian employees (excluding postal 
workers).  The second shutdown lasted 21 days, from December 16 to January 6.  It affected roughly 
284,000 nondefense employees, or 14% of the total.8  Together, then, these shutdowns covered almost 
4 weeks.  In August of 1996 the CBO estimated that those shutdowns subtracted only 0.5 percentage 
point from GDP growth during the fourth quarter of 1995.9  Calibrating those events to today’s 
economy, we estimate that a two-week shutdown would directly trim about 0.3 percentage point from 
                                                             
7 A basis point is one one-hundredth of one percent; hence 38 basis points are 0.38 of a full percentage point.   
8 Between the first and second shutdowns, an appropriations bill was passed covering the Department of Defense. 
9 Congressional Budget Office, The Economic and Budget Outlook: An Update (August 1996), Chapter 1, page 2. 
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fourth quarter growth, mainly by interrupting the flow of services produced by federal employees.10   
Knock-on effects into the private sector would be small for a shutdown this brief, especially as Congress 
already has passed motions to ensure furloughed workers receive back pay.      
Hitting Debt Ceiling and Temporarily, Technically Defaulting  
The experience of 2011 suggests that even flirting with default is far worse than shuttering the federal 
government.  On August 2, 2011, the President enacted the Budget Control Act of 2011 that lifted the 
debt ceiling, forestalling a crisis.  Yet shortly afterwards S&P announced the first-ever downgrade of 
Treasury debt, pinning its decision on poor governance.  Credit spreads and the equity risk premium 
immediately jumped, as did the implied volatility of stock prices.  The repercussions were evident in 
financial markets for months afterwards.  GDP growth, which was 3.2% during the second quarter of the 
year, slumped to 1.3% in the third quarter before the rebounding in the fourth.  Not all these effects can 
be ascribed to fiscal uncertainty since an episode of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis blossomed 
simultaneously.  Yet the timing of events two years ago leaves little doubt there is looming risk 
presented in our current tack towards the debt ceiling.  
Technically the U.S. hit that ceiling in May, but since then the Treasury Department has resorted to 
“extraordinary measures” to meet its financial obligations.11  These measures will be exhausted around 
October 17, leaving the Treasury with only $30 billion in cash and any new tax receipts to pay bills 
coming due.12  Projections are that the debt ceiling will become truly binding by the end of the month.  
What would happen then?  The Administration has ruled out as illegal or inappropriate unconventional 
strategies for financing continued government operations.13  Given the criticality of avoiding a debt 
default, the Treasury likely would continue to pay interest and, operationally, separate these payments 
from the nearly 100 million others made monthly.  That action would be possible because interest is 
paid through a separate “FedWire” system.  However, other “primary” spending would have to be cut 
substantially so that the Treasury could continue servicing the debt.14  By failing to pay employees and 
contractors on time the U.S. might breach legal contracts.  By failing to pay benefits such as Social 
Security, it would breach longstanding social compacts.  While such failures would be less pernicious 
than a debt default—and more easily cured—their unprecedented nature would undermine confidence 
in government, rattling financial markets around the world. 
                                                             
10 See “Showdown over a Shutdown: The GDP Effects of a Brief Federal Shutdown”, Macroeconomic Advisers’ 
Macro Focus (Volume 8, Number 7), September 25, 2013. 
11 For example, the Treasury temporarily delayed re-investing federal retirement funds in Treasury debt.  This 
reduced the federal debt held by these funds, creating room under the debt ceiling to sell additional securities to 
the public.  The cash from the sales was then used to pay the federal government’s financial obligations.   
12 Recent reports on the budget talks ongoing in Washington suggest the parties might agree to a three-week 
extension of the debt to buy time for negotiating a larger budget compromise.  That would avert a crisis this month 
but there seems little likelihood of reaching agreement on the long-run fiscal issues so quickly.  Hence, in all 
likelihood we’d soon be facing the debt ceiling again while having generated yet another round of damaging fiscal 
policy uncertainty.  
13 These include invoking the 14th Amendment of the Constitution to keep borrowing, fire-selling Treasury assets, 
minting platinum coins, and issuing IOUs.  
14 Primary spending excludes interest on the debt.  
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If the debt ceiling remained binding for long it would force an unprecedented large and rapid fiscal 
contraction on the economy.  Furthermore, given the unpredictable nature of tax revenues, the 
Treasury could, despite its best efforts to juggle federal finances, still find itself strapped for cash with an 
interest payment coming due. Before then financial uncertainty would spike, likely compelling a hasty 
political resolution of the impasse.  Nevertheless, the uncertainty unleashed by crossing this fiscal 
threshold, however briefly, might undermine economic performance for several years.15 
Scenario 1: Heightened Risk Aversion 
We consider two scenarios in which the debt ceiling is hit briefly in mid-to-late October.  In the first, the 
Treasury prioritizes spending to make the interest payments due on October 31 and November 15.16  
However, Social Security and Medicare payments due on October 23 and November 1 appear 
threatened, as do military, veterans and civil service benefits also due November 1.17  Financial 
conditions deteriorate sharply, forcing a quick resolution of the political impasse that avoids a fiscal 
contraction.  Markets, however, are slow to recover.  Consequently, both the U.S and the global 
economy weaken. 
How large would the economic fallout from this be?  Given the territory is uncharted, no one can say for 
certain.  However, to calibrate the possibilities, we introduced into our model of the U.S. economy a 
large global financial shock starting in November, and compared the results to our “baseline” forecast in 
which the debt ceiling is assumed raised without incident.  In our model the “VIX,” which reflects near-
term volatility in stock prices and is described in the financial press as the “fear index,” serves as a 
general marker for uncertainty.  In this scenario we assumed that in the fourth quarter of 2013 the “VIX” 
temporarily spikes to 45, a level intermediate between that observed during the 2011 brush with the 
debt ceiling and the peak hit when Lehman Brothers failed in 2008.  Thereafter we let the VIX recover 
towards its long run average at a rate suggested by historical experience (Chart 7, red dashed line). The 
ripple effect of this shock raises all measures of risk aversion in our model: the equity risk premium, 
private credit spreads, and banks’ (un)willingness to lend.  As investors eschew risk, financing costs rise, 
the prices of risk assets fall, and the economy slows.  A mild recession ensues, exacerbated by the 
Federal Reserve’s inability to lower short-term interest rates (Chart 8).  Growth in GDP turns briefly 
negative in 2014 before then starting to rebound (Chart 9, red dashed line). The unemployment rate 
rises to a peak of 8.5%, 1.6 percentage points above the baseline—the equivalent of 2.5 million lost jobs.  
Thereafter the unemployment rate does decline, but even two years later the unemployment rate is a 
still full percentage points above the baseline forecast—the equivalent of 1.6 million lost jobs (Chart 10, 
red dashed line). 
                                                             
15 The effects could persist for several reasons.  First, foreigners, who hold almost half the debt, might permanently 
re-allocate their investment portfolios away from Treasury securities.  Second, as occurred in 2011, the major 
rating agencies might again downgrade Treasury debt.  Third, there could be runs on money market funds, forcing 
a liquidity squeeze reminiscent of events in 2008.    Fourth, because Treasuries universally serve as collateral, the 
threat of default could trigger margin calls that precipitate a deleveraging.     
16 $6 billion of interest comes due on October 31, and another $29 billion on November 15. 
17 Social Security payments of $12 billion come due on October 23.  On November 1, $18 billion of Medicare 
payments come due, as do another $25 billion of Social Security payments, and $12 billion in military pay, 
retirement, and veterans benefits. 
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Scenario 2:  Spending Volatility   
As dysfunctional as the federal government now seems, it’s hard to imagine that financial markets 
wouldn’t quickly discipline politicians to end the impasse as assumed in the previous scenario.  
However, to illustrate the costs of not raising the debt ceiling, we assume in this second scenario that 
the political stalemate lasts two months.  Again, interest payments are made on time, but in November 
and December primary spending is cut enough below tax receipts to balance the budget every day for 
two months. The necessary cuts in spending are amplified by the cyclical drop in tax revenues caused 
first by the heightened uncertainty and then exacerbated by the fiscal contraction itself.   
To gauge the effects, we started with the previous simulation and then cut spending by the required 
amount in November and December, but assumed the cuts are reversed and the missed payments 
made up during the first three months of 2014.  The resulting quarterly path of primary spending is 
shown in Chart 11 (red dotted line).  Outlays fall roughly $680 billion (at an annual rate) below the 
baseline path in the fourth quarter, then jump twice that much in the first quarter of next year during 
the catch up, before then falling sharply back to the baseline in the second quarter.  The chart makes 
clear just how unprecedented such short-term volatility in federal spending would be.  
To acknowledge that uncertainty would be both greater and more persistent in this scenario, we assume 
the VIX spikes to the same peak as in 2008 before recovering slower than suggested by historical 
regularities (Chart 7, red dotted line); other measures of risk aversion are sympathetically affected.  The 
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additional uncertainty implies a longer and deeper recession than in the first scenario, but one also 
characterized by extreme volatility imparted by the wild swings in federal spending.  Annualized GDP 
growth whipsaws between plus and minus 8% before the oscillations diminish (Chart 9, red dotted line).  
The unemployment rises unevenly to a peak of 8.9%, 2 full percentage points above the baseline 
forecast and the equivalent 3.1 million lost jobs.  Two year later the unemployment rate is still 1.6 
percentage points above the baseline—the equivalent of 2.5 million lost jobs (Chart 10, red dotted line.) 
Summary and Conclusions 
The results presented here suggest that fiscal drag, in combination with heightened fiscal uncertainty, 
has slowed the annualized rate of growth in the nation’s Gross Domestic Product by as much as 1 
percentage point since 2010.  And while the government shutdown is, for now, more economic 
inconvenience overall than catastrophe, hitting the debt ceiling even briefly could cause the next 
recession, even if the U.S. does not default on its debt.  
These estimates are uncertain—especially those describing the potential impacts of hitting the debt 
ceiling.  Economic models derive their predictive power from past empirical regularities, and so they 
necessarily become less reliable when used to assess the ramifications of an unprecedented event.  
Furthermore, it is difficult to predict the full extent of the economic and financial instability that might 
accompany a heightened threat of default.  Still, one can assert with confidence that the fiscal policies of 
the last several years have damaged our still-struggling economy.  One can only hope that our 
policymakers will implement more sensible policies in the future but, in surveying today’s political 
landscape, it is easier to be pessimistic than optimistic about the possibilities.         
 
